Today's VICC plenary session marked the completion of the review of a draft they will put before voters, the governor, Congress, and the president of the United States. It was the third plenary session devoted to reviewing VICC's secret constitutional proposal.

This year, VICC has doubled down on its strategy of practical obscurity, something I have written about extensively on this website and won't repeat here. Its motive, beyond a general dislike of genuine openness rather than the appearance of openness, is likely that it doesn't want the public to know about the potential legal and other weaknesses in its draft proposal. That's understandable, but it's also very frustrating for members of the public who want to observe and contribute to the proceedings.

My own interest focuses on the proposed constitution's future amendments article. VICC has refused to provide me or any other member of the public with its draft constitution, including the article on future amendments. And, as far as I can tell, the current review with its two outside advisors hasn't addressed that article. But since VICC refuses to send me the agendas and background materials that delegates receive before each meeting, it's hard for me to tell, and I have not attended all of VICC's committee meetings. I have no doubt that the outside advisors have addressed that article, but the reports they've provided VICC aren't available to the public. Those advisors have provided substantial information at VICC's open meetings, but have also made clear that their private written communications with VICC delegates are more detailed and include information they didn't want to share in public.

Within an hour of this final review plenary session ending, I emailed the following letter to all VICC delegates. I wished VICC had asked me of its own accord for such language or for my feedback on the language of the future amendments provisions they had drafted, but that wasn't in the cards. Drafting my proposed language was made more difficult by VICC's refusal to provide me with its own draft language, despite my multiple requests to review it. But I was worried that if I waited any longer to propose my language, the future amendments provisions would already be a fait accompli.

From: J.H. Snider
Sent: Saturday, August 29, 2026 4:23 PM
To: 'Usie Richards'; 'Stedmann Hodge Jr.'; 'john abramson jr'; 'Rudel Hodge'; 'Rupert W. Ross Jr.'; 'Arturo Watlington Jr.'; 'Akima Richardson'; 'Devin F. Carrington'; 'John M. Canegata'; 'David Silverman'; 'Lydia Hendricks'; 'Lilliana Belardo-ONeal'; 'Alecia Wells'; 'Patricia Welcome'; 'Imani Daniel';
Cc: 'Peter Meyers'; 'Bonny Corbeil';
Subject: Proposed right of constituent power for VICC's draft constitution

 

Dear VICC Delegates:

 

I hope you will consider including a right to constituent power, including its fundamental components, in your proposed constitution's declaration of rights. In 1789, James Madison proposed a series of amendments to the U.S. Constitution that eventually became known as the U.S. Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments. The first amendment Madison proposed was rejected by Congress, partly because it would have undermined the authority of the U.S. Senate whose power was based on the principle of state rather than popular sovereignty. Madison’s amendment, which proposed a right of constituent power, was derived from the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence and the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. My proposed language is modeled on his, but I add a definition of constituent power and its fundamental components, the latter of which were implemented but not abstractly stated by 1789.

 

Of course, I haven’t seen your proposed declaration of rights, and you may already have a constituent rights provision, as many constitutions now do. However, even if you do, it’s unlikely that it includes the fundamental components of constituent rights.

 

Here is my proposed language:

 

All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their benefit. The people retain at all times an unalienable and indefeasible right to change their government in such manner as they deem proper. This inherent authority constitutes the constituent power—the supreme power to make and amend the constitution—which is distinct from, and superior to, the constituted powers delegated to government offices. Because those exercising delegated powers possess an inherent conflict of interest in defining their own authority, the people reserve the exclusive right to bypass the legislature through a safety valve to initiate, propose, and ratify constitutional amendments.

 

Here is Madison’s language from 1789 (see the section beginning “First.”):

 

That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people… That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people... That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.

 

I have tried to make Madison’s language more felicitous and modern, so I’ve changed his wording without changing his meaning. I also added two sentences summarizing constituent power theory, including the powers of initiation, proposal, and ratification. This theory was first implemented in Massachusetts in the late 1770s, when it pioneered the institution of the constitutional convention and mandated a referendum to call one. (In practice, the voting was conducted at local Massachusetts town meetings rather than a modern referendum via a statewide ballot; the statewide referendum that we know today had not yet been invented.)

 

Although I haven’t been allowed access to your draft constitution, I believe it already incorporates some form of constituent initiation, proposal, and ratification powers (for example, the initiative incorporates one type of initiation power). But, to my knowledge, the principles of constituent power and its fundamental components have not been abstractly stated, unlike many of the other structural provisions in your proposed constitution.

 

One possible revision to my language would be to combine initiative and proposal power into “agenda-setting” power. Note that ratification power only allows the people to bypass the legislature in approving or rejecting, not initiating and proposing, constitutional changes.  I believe that ambiguity in the use of the terms initiative, proposal, and ratification powers is warranted because over the coming decades, the meaning of these terms could and should substantially evolve. For example, the meaning of “freedom of speech” in the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment has substantially evolved over the last few hundred years, so it was prudent for the framers not to anticipate how new technology and institutional innovations would change its meaning.

 

I have briefly presented my argument for constituent power and its fundamental components in an essay I published in The Renovator’s newsletter. The Renovator’s audience is the U.S. democratic reform and civic education

community.

 

Sincerely,

 

J.H. Snider

Author of Periodic State Constitutional Convention Referendums: Their Development Since America’s Founding (Routledge, 2026) and editor of The State Constitutional Convention Clearinghouse.

Here are my meeting comments and their replies in the chat room:

Richard Albert 12:26 PM
I was asked to share the essay I referenced in my remarks -- the one written by the president of the most recent constitution-making body in Chile. Here it is: https://constitutionalstudies-ojs-utexas.tdl.org/cs/article/view/205/187

Bonny CORBEIL 12:26 PM
Thank you.

J.H. Snider 1:27 PM
Thank you. If this is part of an academic conversation, I'd welcome seeing the various perspectives.

Bonny CORBEIL 1:37 PM
As a constituent Jim….I am grateful and Thankful that you attend these 6 th. CC meetings in your role of expert in CC’s. ✌️🙏

J.H. Snider 2:05 PM
Unlike Richard Albert, I have minimal knowledge of constitutional law. My expertise is only in constitutional convention law and politics as well as related legislature bypass institutions.

Bonny CORBEIL 2:06 PM
Thank you Jim. You are still a great asset to this entire process.